In Prahl, Hofvenstam & Ågeback v Lapinski [2025] EAT 77, the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) confirmed that the Employment Tribunal (ET) had international jurisdiction to hear discrimination claims brought under the Equality Act 2010 (EqA 2010) against individual respondents domiciled in Sweden. This appeal decision is a significant marker in the evolving landscape of cross-border employment litigation in the UK, particularly in the post-Brexit legal environment.

This post summarises the key aspects of the Lapinski decision and explores its broader implications for employers or legal practitioners dealing with cross-border employment disputes.

Jurisdictional Challenges in the ET: The Legal Framework

 A claimant can bring claims under the EqA 2010 or whistleblowing legislation against both corporate and individual respondents. Under sections 110-112 of the EqA 2010, individuals (whether employees, agents, or even third parties) can be held liable for acts that are treated as done by their employer or principal. This framework allows for the possibility that individual respondents domiciled abroad may be named in an ET claim, particularly where claimants worked for multinational employers or in peripatetic roles.

When faced with cross-border employment claims, UK tribunals must determine two distinct jurisdictional questions:

  1. Territorial Jurisdiction – Whether the claimant can rely on UK statutory employment rights, based on the connection between the employment and Great Britain, applying the principles set out in Lawson v Serco [2006] ICR 250.  In this case it was common ground that the tribunal had territorial jurisdiction.
  2. International Jurisdiction – This concerns whether one country’s courts are considered to be the correct forum for the dispute.  Following the UK’s departure from the EU and the cessation of the Recast Brussels Regulation on 31 December 2020, questions of international jurisdiction are now governed by the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (CJJA 1982).  The Tribunal had to consider whether it had the authority under the CJJA 1982 to hear a claim involving a party domiciled outside the UK.  Section 15C CJJA 1982 provides that, in certain cases, a non-UK domiciled employer may be sued by an employee in the UK.

The Facts in Lapinski

The claimant, a former LLP member, brought claims under the EqA 2010 against his former LLP and individual respondents, including three individuals domiciled in Sweden.   For the Swedish individuals, the tribunal posted notice of the claim and the claim form to their usual business address in Stockholm.  The individuals did not dispute that they had received the claim.  While jurisdiction over the UK-based respondents was not contested, the Swedish respondents argued that the ET lacked international jurisdiction to hear claims against them.

The ET dismissed their challenge, prompting an appeal to the EAT.

The EAT’s Decision

HHJ Auerbach upheld the ET’s conclusions and dismissed the appeal.  He pointed out that the essential underlying premise of the appeal is that where the particular respondents were not domiciled in the UK, it was not sufficient that the tribunal has a cause-of-action and territorial jurisdiction. The tribunal had to identify the applicable rule of international jurisdiction, and to ascertain whether it had also been satisfied. In determining that the ET were correct to consider that they had international jurisdiction to consider the claim, the following findings were made:

  • The claimants had argued that the ET had correctly concluded that the claim had been properly served on the individuals in accordance with the ET Rules and there is no requirement for permission to serve outside the jurisdiction in those rules. The EAT held that the ET Rules provide a complete and self-contained code for service in employment tribunal proceedings.  The risk of injustice to a respondent because, for example, the claim has not come to its attention could be addressed by the tribunal exercising its powers to extend time for entering a response and/or to reconsider and revoke a preliminary judgment.  The ET was therefore not wrong to conclude that the claimant, having complied with the Employment tribunal rules in terms of presenting the claim to the Employment Tribunal and serving the claims on the Swedish individuals, no further step was required in order for the individuals to be subjected to the tribunal’s jurisdiction.
  • The EAT did go on to consider the issues regarding 15C CJJA 1982, holding that the principles underpinning that section are intended to replicate the protective jurisdictional approach of the Brussels Regulation.
  • The Respondent had contended that section 15C was not satisfied in relation to them because it only applies to employees and only in respect of a claim against the employer.  In this case, the claimant had been a member of an LLP not an employee under a contract of employment, and none of the individuals were his “employer,” in fact they did not have any contract with him at all. The ET had determined that there was no need to satisfy the provisions of section 15C at all, but that alternatively there was in any event, a good arguable case that its provisions were satisfied and that he was an employee for these purposes.  The concept of a “contract of employment” must be broadly construed and the focus should be on the substance of the relationship rather than the legal structure in which it sits.  In this case there was a good arguable case that there was the necessary degree of subordination.
  • The definition of “employer” should retain a degree of elasticity. In this case, there were features that supported a good arguable case that all of the appellants were agents or employees of the first respondent, and it was desirable for certainty and to avoid multiplicity of proceedings that the claimant did not have to sue the appellants separately in Sweden.
  • The legislative intent behind section 15C is to preserve the rights of claimants and it was introduced to ensure that UK employees were in no worse position post Brexit than before and to avoid multiple proceedings arising from the same factual matrix.

HHJ Auerbach further noted that the EAT should be “slow to infer that Parliament had intended positively to remove or curtail the right of a claimant to bring a claim (…) except by the clearest of words.”

Conclusion

Lapinski is an important case in that it provides guidance on international jurisdiction in the ET post-Brexit. It confirms that:

  • The ET Rules do not impose technical hurdles for serving respondents abroad.  However, the ET rules themselves will not of themselves confer jurisdiction.
  • Section 15C CJJA 1982 is designed to mirror the protective stance of the Brussels Regulation in an employment context and, as a result, the concept of “employment” under section 15C should be construed widely.  

This case underscores the ET’s role as a practical and accessible forum for claimants seeking redress in complex, multi-jurisdictional employment disputes.

Many thanks to Salma Khatab for her help in preparing this post